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Abstract
This paper seeks to draw out this focus on form in British pub-
lic administration reform by focusing on the role that the idea of the
corporate form has played in reform. Drawing on the codification of
Foundation Trusts in the English NHS, I argue that, while account-
ability ought to be considered as a ‘social space’ in which conduct
conducive to particular interests emerges, reformers tend to regard ac-
countability as a function of appropriate procedures and forms. The
turn to the corporate form relies on a hope that it will deliver various
’accountability’ benefits will emerge. This hope, I argue, is misplaced.
Introduction.
Following Raymond Williams (Williams, 1976), Dubnick (Dubnick,
2014) describes accountability as a ‘cultural keyword,’ where the con-
cept has:
. . . gone from a relatively narrow range of applications re-
flecting a simple sense of its meaning (typically indicating a
condition where one party is answerable to another for some
X) to an expansive, ambiguous and often enigmatic term
with considerable cultural gravitas cutting across many cul-
tural domains (Dubnick, 2014).1
∗My thanks to Mel Dubnick, University of New Hampshire for his many insights and
comments on this paper. All mistakes are of course my own.
1See also discussions in Dubnick & Justice, 2013.
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As such, accountability is best understood as a social setting (a ‘space’)
within which organisational relationships are given purpose and ex-
pectations are managed. It is, by these lights, ‘the administration of
administration’ (O’Kelly & Dubnick, 2013).
Public sector reform, at least as it pertains to the quest for ‘ac-
countability’ is in large part an experiment with forms: it involves
reformers applying organisational forms to particular functions with a
view towards the production of ‘accountability.’ Reformers – for the
purposes of this paper, those driving the latest round of New Pub-
lic Management-style reforms, on which more below – do not regard
accountability as a social space in and of itself however, but as a emer-
gent function of the construction of appropriate spaces, from which
accountability (as they understand it) will emerge. This perspective
is essentially procedural and governmental : it can be manufactured
through formal design and from there effects itself upon a cascade of
formal and informal functions through which people work.
To an extent, this fascination with design may be itself a product
of the tools that reformers have to hand as they build: law lends itself
primarily to design projects and regulatory scrutiny to legible inter-
locutors (as discussed in Scott, 1998). That said, reformers may also
be echoing central trends in our time: the privileging of ‘leaderism’
(see for instance O’Reilly & Reed, 2011, 2010); of juridification (privi-
leging law over, say, ministerial scrutiny) and – most importantly – of
procedural and contractual governance as core building blocks of or-
ganisational design. ‘Construct the appropriate space,’ reformers seem
to say, ‘and accountability will come.’
This paper seeks to draw out this focus on form in British pub-
lic administration reform by focusing on the role that the idea of the
corporate form has played in reformers’ imaginations. Drawing on the
latest phase in what David Hunter describes as the English National
Health Service’s twenty-five year (now thirty-year, presumably) pro-
cess of ‘permanent revolution’ (Hunter, 2005, p. 209), I discuss the
construction of Foundation Trusts as important instances in the de-
sign of appropriate procedural spaces from which particular kinds of
accountability are hoped to follow.
Specifically, NHS reform aims to cut waste, increase patient and
clinician power and simplify the Service’s processes, all by virtue of
incoporation.2 Instituted under the 2003 and 2006 Acts (Health and
Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act, 2003, National
Health Service Act, 2006) and continued under the 2012 Act (Health
and Social Care Act, 2012), Foundation Trusts are the ‘provision’ side
of a long reform series initiated by the notional separation of healthcare
provision and consumption in the NHS in the early 1990s (see Allen,
Bartlett, Perotin, Zamora, & Turner, 2011, p. 78ff). They aim, as the
Department of Health put it in 2010, to:
2The reforms discussed have have occurred in the English National Health Service.
The United Kingdom’s three other jurisdictions (Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales)
have taken their own paths to reform, largely in response to budgetary pressures imposed
from central government in London.
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liberate professionals and providers from top-down control.
This is the only way to secure the quality, innovation and
productivity needed to improve outcomes. We will give re-
sponsibility for commissioning and budgets to groups of GP
practices; and providers will be freed from government con-
trol to shape their services around the needs and choices of
patients. Greater autonomy will be matched by increased
accountability to patients and democratic legitimacy, with
a transparent regime of economic regulation and quality in-
spection to hold providers to account for the results they
deliver (Department of Health, 2010, p. 27).
In other words, they hope to produce all manner of functional effects
by imposing a formal design from which those effects are held to flow.
My argument is that this reformer perspective relies upon a pro-
found misunderstanding of the emergence of ‘associational forms,’ the
role that they have played in the history of business, of community-
based projects and of resource-allocation within the corporate econ-
omy. Reformers misunderstand the logical connections between com-
panies in their various forms and firms in their various functions. They
see the corporate form as a kind of practice (an appropriate space from
where accountability will emerge), when in fact it is a mirror to prac-
tices largely separate to itself. The corporate form is a codification, a
confirmation and a formalisation of administrative accountability prac-
tices that already existed in economic, business and social life. Flowing
from their misunderstanding of the corporate form, furthermore, re-
formers are enthralled by an idea of the corporate form in NPM that is
sure to lead to disappointment as reform fails to deliver on its promises
– once again.
This paper, as such, is largely diagnostic. In addition to a discussion
of Foundation Trusts as codified forms, reformers’ misunderstandings
of the corporate form is set out by drawing and expanding on socio-legal
critiques of ‘mainstream’ theories of the firm and on historically-driven
discussions of the origins of the company.3 From that, the paper goes
on to make some remarks regarding why the idea of the corporate form
at play here – and of where accountability can be situated – is unlikely
to produce the effects they desire, and indeed may possibly produce
effects that are neither intended nor desirable.
Crucially, the argument relies on the following insight: while re-
formers’ see the corporate form as productive of ‘accountability:’ de-
sirable ‘administration of administration’ (O’Kelly & Dubnick, 2013),
it is better described as mirroring practices that were deemed, before
they were codified, to ‘be accountability’ within the context of highly
specific purposes and practices. Given this, confidence that the impo-
sition of the form onto other highly specific purposes and practices will
lead to the emergence of accountability is, at best, misplaced.
3I use the terms ‘company’ and ‘corporation’ interchangeably in this paper: they denote
the legal entity and are opposed to terms like ‘firm’ and ‘assocation:’ assemblages of
practice oriented towarsd particular business or communal or other ends.
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Thinking About the Corporate Form.
Before embarking on this discussion it is worth, for the sake of clarity,
making some remarks regarding the corporate form itself. Specifi-
cally, the following four points are crucial: 1) the corporation is an
autonomous person, granted through law (primarily in the Companies
Act, 2006, although, as we see below, corporate forms are also codified
in other locations). It can contract on its own behalf, is possessed of
identity and agency and owns the assets that have either been trans-
ferred to it or that it has acquired on its own behalf. The idea of
corporate personhood has been subject to much debate over time (see
for instance Hobbes, 1996, chap. XIV; see also List & Pettit, 2011 for a
more recent take),4 but for our purposes it suffices to note that the cor-
poration is not merely a ‘convenient fiction,’ shorthand for or oriented
by neccessity towards the interests of shareholders or other members;
2) the corporation’s existence is constitutional not contractual. The
corporate constitution (generally held to exist in the articles of associ-
ation) establishes the allocation of power over corporate strategy, over
decisions involving the allocation of the surplus, and over the corporate
purpose (see for instance Bottomley, 2007); 3) the corporation is not
owned (on this point, see Ireland, 1999; Worthington, 2001a, 2001b).
Members may be allocated with shares that give them some limited
constitutional rights – limited voting rights over board membership
for instance – or they may be associated with the company by means
to which other rights and obligations are attached (for instance if the
company is limited ‘by guarantee’ or has is a mutual or friendly society.
The company itself is autonomous however. The company’s liabilities
do not attach to the membership and – beyond what is constitution-
ally specified – the members have no rights over the company’s assets
or its governance (this principle that was established very early in the
history of company law. See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndi-
cate Co. Ltd v. Cuninghame, 1906); 4) companies (those limited by
shares in this instance) ought not be confused with firms (on which,
see Robé, 2011). As we see below, firms are productive organisations,
perhaps with a global span or with a quite specific focus. They are
characterised by assemblages of practices, productive managerial and
supervisorial. A single firm – take Apple for instance – may be asso-
ciated with a large group of companies. Alternatively one company
might theoretically be associated with a large group of firms. Firms
are businesses (or the like). Companies are legal forms.
People establish companies (or mutual societies etc) because the
corporate form is convenient to the kinds of association that they are
pursuing. It may suit people, for instance, to transfer shared assets
to a company in exchange for an allocation of shares. Or it might
be convenient to share a communal endeavour – the distribution of
home-ownership for example – to a mutual society.
The social spaces that emerge within firms produce ‘accountability’
4Hobbes’s insights resonate in very interesting ways elsewhere also, for instance in the
work of Quentin Skinner (1999, 2005) and of Hannah Pitkin (Pitkin, 1964a, 1964b, 1967).
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in the sense that they draw on a variety of practices to promote ‘desir-
able’ behaviour (to managers, capitalists, entrepreneurs etc) in order
to shape conduct within their bounds. Where they interact with the
corporate form they normally (a) formalise some subset of practices
that already exist in a particular association (allocation of the surplus
arising from a business for example); (b) establish a specific kind of
close association (an local credit union, say); or (c) enable a shift in
liabilities so that risks to the (hitherto) business owners or the like are
minimised and/or that additional investment can be sought. The cor-
porate form itself is at best a secondary contributor to these practices
and, historically speaking, has tended not to drive but to mirror the
practices, driven in large part by powerful economic actors bringing
their interests to bear on the law-making process (on which see for
instance Johnson, 2010).
When it comes to the kinds of accountability practices that emerged
in commerce and elsewhere the corporate form in and of itself – and the
act of incorporation – is, again, secondary at best in their production.
It is a form that, where it is convenient, is exploited towards highly
specific ends and in very particular circumstances. And as recent (and
not-so-recent) events in the corporate world suggest, it is not a driver
of performance or efficiency unless that performance or efficiency was
already there. It is not a driver of member sovereignty unless that
sovereignty was already there. It is not a driver of transparency unless
the will to be transparent already exists or unless a legislative arrange-
ment (mandatory audit for instance) serves some particular interest.
This all matters because the corporate form has become a key tool
in the reforming arsenal, in particular as it attaches itself to the NHS.
We ought not assume that Foundation Trusts are merely avatars sit-
ting on the provision side of a juridified and manufactured healthcare
marketplace.5 When Anne Davies for instances states, that recent
reforms (through the Health and Social Care Act, 2012) have seen
the subjection of NHS processes to competition law, the autonomisa-
tion of ‘front-line’ actors and the weak scope of formal ‘accountability’
mechanisms (Davies, 2013, p. 567), we should remember that it is cor-
porations that are the subjects of competition law, that corporations
are the ‘front-line’ actors at play in this reform and that corporations
are the subjects of the accountability mechanisms. The reform is a
‘corporatisation’ reform. The question I seek to answer in the next
sections is: why?
Foundation Trusts as Corporate Forms.
NHS Foundation Trusts are “public benefit corporation(s) which [are]
authorised . . . to provide goods and services for the purposes of the
health service in England” (National Health Service Act, 2006, sec.
5Juridified in the sense that “the 2012 Act [involving] much greater use of law to struc-
ture and regulate the NHS, in place of traditional mechanisms like ministerial direction”
(Davies, 2013, p. 567).
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30.1). They are one of a range of possible ‘authorised providers’ of
healthcare to the commissioning element in the NHS, marked out by
the fact that they have been carved out from the existing vertically-
administered NHS (first as NHS Trusts, then, upon application to Mon-
itor, the healthcare regulator, as Foundation Trusts). While Founda-
tion Trusts are sited within the NHS, they are independent of control
from the Department of Health in Whitehall. They are not subject to
performance management and they can retain their surpluses and put
them to their own use. They sit, as alluded to above, as providers in
a (simulated in part) healthcare marketplace with their services deliv-
ered largely – at the moment – to the Clinical Commissioning Groups,
also ‘bodies corporate’ (Health and Social Care Act, 2012, sec. 10),
that commission services on behalf of patients.
As such, Foundation Trusts constitute a unique kind of corporate
body, similar but by no means identical to companies limited by shares
or by guarantee (Companies Act, 2006) and Community Interest Com-
panies (As constituted in the Companies (Audit, Investigations, and
Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, pt. 5). The discussion above fo-
cused upon particular corporate forms – the company itself, primarily
– Foundation Trusts are incorporated through powers introduced in
law for the NHS itself (through the Health and Social Care (Com-
munity Health and Standards) Act, 2003, the National Health Service
Act, 2006, and the Health and Social Care Act, 2012). That said, their
form – and those of Clinical Commissioning Groups on the other side
of the NHS’s ‘market’ – is drawn closely from company law.
Modelled on cooperatives and on mutual organisations (for a dis-
cussion see Klein, 2006, p. 228ff), Foundation Trusts share at their
core important characteristics of other corporate forms, and are sub-
ject to the same observations made in the section above. That is,
they are autonomous, self-owned persons with all that entails. Where
they differ from the company as such, in a sense, is in their origin and
the legislative (and reformer) intent underpinning their existence, on
which more below. Importantly, their governance structures, though
they mirror mutualism on the surface, are traditionally corporate in
important respects, specifically regarding their hierarchical and board
structures, their legal personalities and their financial reporting and
other obligations.
Foundation Trusts as Democratic Entities.
Public participation in the running of local services has been at the fore
of British governance since the beginning of the Blair era in the late
1990s (Allen, 2009; For discussions see for instance Allen, Townsend,
et al., 2012; Day & Klein, 2005; see also Pratchett, 2004; Tritter, 2011;
Veronesi & Keasey, 2011), and has been revisited through the ‘big so-
ciety’ initiatives of the Cameron era (see for instance Teasdale, Alcock,
& Smith, 2012; Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012; Pattie & Johnston, 2011;
Ellison, 2011). Foundation Trusts are situated within this dynamic in
their resemblance to companies limited by guarantee and to community
6
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interest companies.
In the case of Foundation Trusts, membership is drawn from lo-
cal residents, employees, and patients and their carers (excluding vol-
untary or professional carers) (National Health Service Act, 2006, p.
Schedule 7, para. 3). Membership is generally available on application,
is unpaid and voluntary and brings one within a voting constituency
for the Trust’s ‘board of governors,’ a ‘supervisory’ board elected from
within the membership populations (in accordance with a variety of
stipulations. See National Health Service Act, 2006, p. Schedule 7,
paragraphs 7–14).
The board of governors, in turn, scrutinises and supervises (within
its powers) the conduct of both executive and non-executive directors
(on this see Monitor, 2010, pt. C. & E., and Monitor 2012) and popu-
lating the nominations committee for non-executive director (Monitor,
2012). Foundation Trust governors have statutory duties to represent
members and to act in the interests of the Trust etc. They simulate
the oversight that an (ideal) population of institutional shareholders
might perform in a company limited by shares. They formally appoint
directors in general meeting, act as a venue for the dissemination of
corporate information by key board members. They ought not, as the
healthcare regulator has it, use their powers to obstruct the board of
director's role in deciding and acting on the strategic direction of the
Trust (Monitor, 2010, para. B.1.9). In a way, we can see the members
and governors as engaging with their Foundation Trust partly through
their influence over nominations and partly as a ‘public’ rendered tan-
gible and accessible and with whom directors may speak.
Foundation Trusts’ boards of directors are modelled on the conven-
tional ‘unitary board’ model drawn from the ‘Anglo’ style of corporate
governance. Boards are populated by a mix of executive and non-
executive directors, with an independent non-executive chair, a series of
governance committees (nomination, audit and remuneration). They
have full powers to set strategic priorities for the Trust. Non-executive
directors, who are full board members but are normally expected to
have a disciplinary role ‘representing’ stakeholders, must normally be
drawn from either the public or patients constituencies from which the
membership is drawn National Health Service Act, Schedule 7 para 16
(4) (A). The board of governors appoint or remove the non-executive
directors, the non-executive directors appoint or remove the Chief Ex-
ecutive director (with a vote of approval from the board of governors)
and it is for a committee made up of the non-executive directors, the
CEO and the chair to appoint or remove other executive directors Na-
tional Health Service Act, Schedule 7 para 17 (1–5).
Similarly with regard to remuneration and allowances, the board
of governors decide the remuneration of non-executive directors and
the non-executives in turn decide the remuneration of executive direc-
tors National Health Service Act, Schedule 7 para 18 (1–2). It is the
board of governor’s duty to “hold the non-executive directors individ-
ually and collectively to account for the performance of the board of
directors” and to “represent the interests of the members of the cor-
7
Ciarán O’Kelly EGPA PSG VI, Edinburgh 2013
poration as a whole and the interests of the public” (Health and Social
Care Act, 2012, pt. 4 para 151 (4)), though formal action is restricted
to governors’ powers of appointment.
Executive and non-executive directors share a duty to promote “the
success of the corporation so as to maximise the benefits for the mem-
bers of the corporation as a whole and for the public” (Health and
Social Care Act, 2012, pt. 4 para 152 (1))). This echoes company di-
rectors’ duties as contained in section 172 of the Companies Act 2006,
at least when it comes to promoting the success of the corporation. In
the Companies Act, success is to be promoted ‘for the benefit of the
members,’ although directors ought, among other considerations, to
have regard to “the impact of the company’s operations on the com-
munity and the environment” (Companies Act, 2006, sec. 172).
Monitor, the regulator for healthcare, has published a Code of Gov-
ernance for Foundation Trusts that mirrors the UK Corporate Gover-
nance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012) in setting out the
principles to which Trusts ought to adhere.’ Foundation Trust ad-
herence to the code is mandated on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, so
Foundation Trusts can choose either to comply with specific princi-
ples or to publish an explanation regarding their choice not to comply
(Monitor, 2010). This is in keeping with what is considered to be
‘best practice’ for corporate governance in the commercial sector, and
is the foundation of the UK’s delegated self-regulation for listed com-
panies. As a system it is designed to promote autonomy and to keep
firm practices free of procedures that boards deem to be unsuitable.
In practice, some scepticism has been raised about the effects that it
has in promoting directorial power at the members’ expense (for some
perspectives, see I. MacNeil & Li, 2006; Moore, 2009; Arcot, Bruno, &
Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Keay, 2013).
The principles upon which Foundation Trusts are governed focus on
the idea that the success for the corporation can be defined in terms of
the pursuit of success ‘for the benefit of its members’ (Companies Act,
2006, sec. 172 (1)) and additionally, in the case of Foundation Trusts,
for the public at large. What this conception of success might mean for
the corporation’s strategic direction is, as I said above, in very large
part a matter of discretion for the corporation’s directors (so long as
they can reasonably be described as acting in ‘good faith’ (Companies
Act, 2006, sec. 172 (1))). Unless a power is reserved for members in
legislation or in the corporate constitution, directorial primacy prevails:
it is up to directors to judge how that success might best be pursued
(on director primacy and the corporate form, see Bainbridge, 2006,
2008).
As such, while the formal framework around Foundation Trusts
holds itself out as emphasising local ‘democracy,’ as a corporation it is
not simply an articulation of members’ will. A consultative role and
a (limited) franchise in terms of governance may lead to the Trusts
soliciting members’ views, but there is no sense in which members can
claim any more than this with regard to these companies: they are
self-owning entities guided by a largely sovereign board.
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This is a significant aspect of the argument: the mutual model as
a formal device,6 has been successfully used as a vehicle for particular
kinds of association and movement at particular times. It seems to
work quite well in those circumstances. That said, its existence in
law reflects those successes: it did not produce them. Codification
involved a verification and formalisation of associations that existed
anyway. Mutualism’s existence ought not persuade us that mutualism
and organisational democracy can be produced through legislatively
mandated procedures.
Board-driven organisations are likely to largely remain just that,
whatever powers of input are distributed to others. And while mem-
bers’ and governors’ voting rights may have a disciplinary effect, ex-
perience from the corporate governance field suggests that members’
capacities to challenge board autonomy are limited, especially when
– as seems to be the case with Foundation Trusts – memberships are
largely passive in their oversight activities (on this see for instance
Dixon, Storey, & Alvarez Rosete, 2010).
Consider for instance Foundation Trusts’ provision of services to
private patients. This is very likely to be one area where tensions
around directorial power versus membership will might come to the
fore in the wake of the 2012 Act. Up until the 2012 Health and Social
Care Act, Foundation Trusts were restricted in the amount of income
they were permitted to earn from services to private – as in, non-NHS –
patients. In essence they could not grow their ‘Private Patient Income’
above 2003 levels (National Health Service Act, 2006, sec. 44, see also
Regina (Unison) v Monitor, 2009). Under the 2012 Act, however,
Foundation Trusts are to be regulated – at least in theory – “in the
same way as any other providers, whether from the private or voluntary
sector” (Department of Health, 2010, p. 36) – and as such may act
as ‘liberated’ social enterprises, tailoring “governance arrangements to
their local needs” (Department of Health, 2010, p. 36). In this light,
restrictions on Private Patient Income have been removed (Health and
Social Care Act, 2012, sec. 165), although Trusts must earn more than
half their income from the provision of NHS services (Health and Social
Care Act, 2012, sec. 164 (1)).
How NHS income ought to be balanced with non-NHS clinical and
non-clinical income is a matter for directors to decide, although it
might go to the heart of the corporate purpose. As I said above, it is
difficult, as is often the case in corporate governance, to see how such
‘business judgement’ decisions might be challenged by boards, gover-
nors or members. Nonetheless, it is likely that private patient income
will be a source of some tension, as financial returns for the organisa-
tion – and perhaps its financial sustainability or even its capacity to
general remuneration for directors – are balanced against benefits for
‘ordinary’ members.
6Largely situated in the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts, 1965-2002, though
many community companies are incorporated in any case under the Companies Act, 2006.
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Foundation Trusts as Autonomous Entities.
The 2012 Act seeks to codify independence of action (from govern-
ment) on the part of Foundation Trust boards. This is underpinned
by a specific duty imposed upon the Secretary of State for Health to
‘promote autonomy’ within the NHS. Namely:
(1) In exercising functions in relation to the health service,
the Secretary of State must have regard to the desirability
of securing, so far as consistent with the interests of the
health service –
1. that any other person exercising functions in relation to
the health service or providing services for its purposes
is free to exercise those functions or provide those ser-
vices in the manner that it considers most appropriate,
and
2. that unnecessary burdens are not imposed on any such
person (Health and Social Care Act, 2012, sec. 5).
This autonomy is motivated in large part by the perception that Foun-
dation Trusts will use that independence, and the financial powers it
brings, to maintain internal controls over the organisation with a view
to maximising efficiency, to seek advantages in the provision of health-
care services to consumers (Clinical Commissioning Groups largely),
and to ‘shop around’ for the most (cost-)effective services from dif-
ferent sub-providers: indeed the expectation would be that executive
remuneration packages contain incentives towards such ends. In ad-
dition, of course, the redefined relationship between the Secretary for
Health and the NHS passes responsibility for the provision of health-
care – formally at least – onto the Foundation Trusts themselves (for
the implications of such a switch, see Christensen & Lægreid, 2007,
2006; on this element in NHS reform, see Davies, 2013).
Internally, in keeping with mainstream corporate governance the-
ory, governance towards efficiency and service might be maintained
through incentives systems. On the one hand, oversight by non-executive
directors, governors and members will, policy-makers hope, discipline
executives to attend to the success of the corporation for the benefit
of the members and the public at large. Externally, competition for
patients and consumers through their GPs or through other forms of
entry to healthcare (or through related business opportunities) will be
the driver for efficiency and equality. After all, as Andrew Lansley, the
Health Secretary who drove the reform had it, “competition between
organisations facilitates the adoption of new treatments and technolo-
gies, and allows innovative individuals within those organisations to
flourish. It is a critical element of healthcare system reform.”7 How
7Lansley, 2012; for debates on the merits of competition for patients in the (pre 2013)
NHS, see Beckford, 2011; Cooper, Gibbons, Jones, & McGuire, 2011a; Gibbons, 2012;
Bloom, Propper, Seiler, & Van Reenen, 2011; Cooper, Gibbons, Jones, & McGuire, 2010,
2012; Cooper, 2010; Pollock, Macfarlane, & Greener, 2012; Pollock, Majeed, et al., 2011;
Bloom, Cooper, et al., 2011; Pollock, Macfarlane, et al., 2011; Pollock, Price, & Roderick,
10
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the formal structures of Foundation Trusts are supposed to allow in-
novative individuals to flourish is left to our imagination, but we can
presume that ‘innovative’ here does not mean innovative in terms of
clinical care in and of itself, but in terms of measures to which the cor-
porate form is amenable: effectiveness, efficiency, and profitability etc.
‘Innovation’ is that which attracts business or reduces costs. Founda-
tion Trusts, as such, are designed to balance both the most convenient
features of market forms and the most desirable features of mutual
forms.
Nonetheless, government has not allowed Foundation Trust auton-
omy wholesale. The 2012 Act has embedded a number of restrictions
on corporate conduct into the system. Primary among them of course,
is the regulation of the quality of care through the Care Quality Com-
mission (Department of Health, 2013), although it is up to Monitor, the
healthcare regulator, to enter into enforcement actions against Trusts
that breach standards. Layered on top of that are three other regula-
tory interventions: a pricing system for NHS services, a licensing sys-
tem for NHS-approved providers, and the statutsory extension and in-
tegration of competition law into NHS procurement practices. As Anne
Davies has it above, this all amounts to the ‘juridification’ of market
integration in the NHS (For a longer account of these see Davies, 2013,
p. 165ff; see also Economic Insight, 2012). This means that a marketi-
sation imperative driven from managerial intervention has switched to
one driven from the legal foundations of the NHS itself: this represents
a switch, to put in Romzek and Dubnick's terms, from market-making
practices drawing on bureaucratic accountability perculating through
the system to expanded and reinforced practices imposed through a
new framework of legal accountability (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, p.
230).
Nonetheless, concern has already emerged about the effects of local
autonomy both on standards of care and of the character of corporate
governance that Foundation Trusts has produced. A scandal arose
around the mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust – an entity that was busily
seeking Foundation Trust status – was found to not only be carrying
a relatively high death rate related to emergency admissions and on
some of its wards (Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection
(The Healthcare Commission), 2009, p. 22), but was found to be
governed by a board predominantly focused on attaining Foundation
Trust status. This focus drove massive cuts in staff numbers (and in
morale). A board-level drive to achieve a surplus with a view towards
attaining Foundation Trust status led to an 8% cut in turnover, an
18% reduction in the number of beds, a reduction in the number of
nurses when the hospital was already understaffed and a board that
was focused primarily on marketing & public relations (Commission
for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (The Healthcare Commission),
2012; Cooper, Gibbons, Jones, & McGuire, 2011b; See also Pollock, Shaoul, & Vickers,
2002.
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2009, pp. 9–10).8 When alerts were issued, they were blamed on the
unreliability of measures themselves. The possibility of failings in care
was not considered.
Andy Burnham, who had been Secretary for Health at the time,
subsequently expressed his displeasure to Parliament, saying that “I
can remember the shock I felt on reading the first Francis report’s
finding [into the Trust] that, on receiving [Foundation Trust] status,
one of the first things that the Mid Staffs board did was to resolve to
hold more meetings in private. That was an audacious breach of the
spirit of the legislation passed by this House” (Hansard, 2013, para.
520–1). In a sense, however, mid-Staffordshire Trust, as a corporate
entity, was working well within the specifications of its design: directors
exploited their decision-making primacy to attend to their interest in
undisrupted decision-making and went on an efficiency drive to attend
to the clearest imperative the corporation faced: getting into surplus.
What they did not attend to was the clinical work of their hospi-
tals: something to which corporatisation does not directly speak. What
was missing, in fact, was an assemblage of practices that might have
oriented the board’s attention elsewhere. These practices were never
going to emerge from legal form – though the autonomy built into
that form, combined with the board-level imperative to pursue direc-
torial ambitions, facilitated misfeasance – they would have to emerge
elsewhere: in the everyday administration of healthcare.
Limitations in the Mainstream Theory of the
Firm.
It is perhaps not surprising that the primary interpretation of the
firm9 in UK policy-making circles is drawn from economic and finan-
cial theory (for a discussion of why particular theories “have legs,” see
Snider, 2000). The current interpretation emerged from finance lit-
erature beginning in the 1970s,10 most notably Michael Jensen and
William Meckling’s ‘Theory of the Firm’ (1976). Built on contempo-
rary economists’ formulations of property rights,11 Jensen and Meck-
ling posit the firm as a ‘convenient fiction’ that describes, not an actual
thing, but more a series of market transactions, articulated in con-
tract, from which production might emerge (Jensen & Meckling, 1976,
p. 310). “It makes little or no sense,” Jensen and Meckling argue,
8Similar findings came from a number of related reports and documents (see The
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry, 2010a, 2010b; Thomé, 2009; The Mid
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2013).
9We use the term ‘firm’ here as an economic association distinct from the corporation
as legal form.
10Although it also drew from Ronald Coase’s classic work on the emergence of admin-
istrative hierarchies in market systems (Coase, 1937).
11Property, that is, as the emergent interplay of ownership, information, distribution
and exchange (see for instance Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn &
Pejovich, 1972; Anderson & Hill, 1975).
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to try to distinguish those things which are ‘inside’ the firm
(or any other organisation) from those things that are ‘out-
side’ of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of
complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fic-
tion (the firm) and the owners of labour, material and capi-
tal inputs and the consumers of output (Jensen & Meckling,
1976, p. 311).
The firm comes within neoclassical economics here, redescribed as a
network of discrete, voluntary and self-contained contracts between
private parties – capital, labour, managerial enterprise etc – and the
interplay of and transaction costs attached to which can be modeled
and analysed. Importantly, it is also held to be efficient : tested in
markets, organisational forms and procedures are, by this light, the
most amenable to the pursuit of efficiency, managerial responsiveness
to investing ‘principals (or, by extension, community members) and
the like.
Accountability emerges in this space in other words because inap-
propriate spaces will lose under the evolutionary pressures of markets
(for products, for executive labour, for investment etc). The firm is an
administrative entity that is verified by – indeed is indistinguishable
from – market exchange and, seemingly, has evolved as an optimal as-
semblage of balanced powers, responsiveness, innovation, transparency
and disclosure. It is little surprise, given this, that the firm has become
the model for market-reforms in public administration.
Company Law.
Company law, within this worldview, simply outlines a default high-
level contracting framework which, absent codification through law,
would be put in place in an efficient market anyway (see Easterbrook &
Fischel, 1991, p. 15). We should note here that ‘contracts’ denote firm
arrangements that are discrete, self-contained, legible and transparent.
In fact, this conception of contract is unfamiliar to contract law scholars
(see for instance Grantham, 1998) and the idea of contract as discrete
and self-contained or of contracts being complete has been subject to
substantial scepticism (see I. R. MacNeil, 1978, 2000, 2001).
Just as importantly for our purposes, we might accept that arrange-
ments within firms can emerge in such a way as to promote social
spaces that come to be described as ‘ accountability.’ That is, they
can promote conduct that is conducive to the more powerful parties
to those arrangements. That said, company law must be seen as quite
a separate – and perhaps even marginal – element in the emergence
of accountability on these terms. This is important in general because
it puts a stop to the idea of company law as facilitating capitalist in-
novation, or efficiency, or responsiveness to principals. Law does not
facilitate capitalism: it mirrors capitalism.
Company law is best seen as emerging parallel to but not directly
from emergent firm accountability arrangements. Whereas the pro-
ductive processes that make up firms are open-ended, often market-
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oriented and fluid, companies map out distributions of powers between
various stakeholders – workers, executives and members – in the strug-
gle to maintain control over the uses to which company assets are put.
What’s more, nexus of contracts theorists’ situating of companies in
markets obscures the degree to which company law formed, not as an
emergent property of markets but as Paul Johnson noted regarding
the construction of Victorian market society, “in accordance with the
design of key actors, and thus reflected both their interests and their
political power” (Johnson, 2010, p. 24).
Law has, in large part, played a role of facilitating, formalising and
codifying firms and other associations, in part as experiments with
particular organisational structures and market associations exposed
vulnerabilities in industrial capitalism (see Alborn, 1998, p. 127ff;
for one discussion of the implications of this, see O’Kelly & Wheeler,
2012) and as part of a statist (‘regulatory capitalist’ perhaps) project
to standardise corporate capitalism towards fiscal and regulatory legi-
bility (Braithwaite, 2008; Scott, 1998).
Regarding the vulnerabilities of industrial capitalism, as partner-
ship structures became ever-more complicated in the search for the
investment levels required by complex industry, creditors found it in-
creasingly difficult to pursue partners for the recovery of debts. They
– and others – pressured Parliament to innovate. This pressure, com-
bined with legislators’ frustration at the sheer volume of petitions from
proposers for private bills of incorporation led to Parliament liberal-
ising the corporate form so that the joint and several liability under-
pinning partnership structures was replaced by the corporate person –
a legal structure that could have the assets of proposers and investors
transferred to it and from there could contract for and be pursued for
debt on its own account (see Johnson, 2010, p. 116ff). Likewise, when
the expansion of the corporate form exposed investors and creditors
to unscrupulous, incompetent or fraudulent corporate proposers, and
when cascades of corporate collapses led to crises in communities of
capitalists around the country, Parliament innovated again by impos-
ing mandatory audits on companies (Companies Act, 1900).
That is not to say that law has been passive in shaping the evo-
lution of capitalism: the emergence of a vibrant secondary market for
shares can in large part be put down to the courts interpreting the
Companies Acts in such a way that shareholder ‘voice’ was restricted
to areas reserved for them in articles of association (see Automatic
Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v. Cuninghame, 1906), thus
making ‘exit’ a desirable option as shareholders diversified portfolios
in order to minimise the risks of managerial arbitrage (tax structures
also played a role here undoubtedly).
What it does mean is that law as it has pertained to commercial
and other associations has always played the role of follower: at no
point has form simply led to function: function has always pointed
form’s way. The massive expansion of associations in industrial and
then late capitalism, for instance, saw capitalists and others (trade
unionists for example, or other social entrepreneurs) associate as they
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saw fit, not just being subject to law, but making use of law where it
served them well, exploring other avenues of association where those
avenue promised more convenient opportunities, and negotiating the
meaning, scope and extent of law with each other and with legislative,
enforcement and regulatory authorities.
As Suchman and Edelman have it, law “is actually a welter of
conflicting principles, imperfect analogies, and ambiguous generalities.
Thus, lawyers, judges, enforcers, and target populations negotiate the
meaning of law in each application, seeking workable consensus rather
than logical certainty” (Suchman & Edelman, 1996, p. 932). Given this
we should see law’s authority, not as an originator of successful, innova-
tive and socially or economically enriching associational cultures, but
as a general framework for the allocation of power over assets through
which – when convenient in particular situations – innovation, success
and enrichment might be organised.
Discussion.
Government reform of the NHS seeks to bring the democratic energy
of the mutualisation movements and the innovation, efficiency and re-
sponsibilisation dynamics of business to bear upon healthcare. But
reformers seek to inject these energies and dynamics into the NHS
through the concoction of corporate forms. This misunderstands the
role of law in the construction of economic and other social associations:
legal form has long been subordinate to social function. Questions arise
as a result, as to whether social functions can flow so successfully from
the manufacturing of a legal form: can reform be successfully effected
by imposing such forms on existing systems of work, association and
collaboration? Legal forms are not disruptive in this sense.
This point also stands with regard to the mutual movement. Mem-
bers’ voting rights may be more extensive in mutual societies, but they
still have no ownership claims over the company and their calls over
strategy are restricted by the articles. It is a body corporate in a
manner similar to that codified in the Companies Acts (Industrial and
Provident Societies Act, 1965, sec. 3).
The ‘mutualisation’ and ‘accountabilisation’ aims of the NHS re-
forms as manifested in the 2006 and 2012 Health Service Acts have
the misconceptions of the nexus of contracts theorists at their core. In
the first place, the idea of the corporation as a ‘fictional’ expression
of members’ interests, and thus (within its own terms) democratic in
purpose, is based on a misapprehension of company law’s role. Even
the mutual style of incorporation sees the company as autonomous
and self-owning. And where the corporate purpose is directed in law
towards the members’ interests, it is a matter for the board to de-
cide how those interests ought best to be pursued. This is crucial for
NHS reform: the construction of autonomous bodies corporate has –
sometimes to the chagrin of policy makers – led to extensions in board
power, not in democratic service. The corporation is a real thing, it
exists beyond the members, and given the location of the directing
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mind in the board, it works if anything under a principle of ‘directorial
primacy’ (on which see Bainbridge, 2008, 2006).
Second, and importantly for questions of performance, corporate
governance is very limited in its application to the associative func-
tions that go into the making of conduct within organisations. While
corporate governance innovations (Financial Reporting Council, 2012)
have aimed themselves at creating board-level checks on director pri-
macy, organisational power still resides with the executives. Secondly,
following from that, NHS reforms rely on the idea of the company
and its contracts as something that is measurable, legible and subject
to regulation. Evidence from corporate governance ought to give us
pause.
Given events at mid-Staffordshire, while the directorial primacy of
the traditional corporate form seems to be emerging in the NHS, the
kinds of mutualist and innovative corporate practices that reformers
seemed to envisage simply have not appeared. Studies on local em-
powerment through Foundation Trusts have suggested that Founda-
tion Trusts have not been wholly successful in engaging widely within
local communities or with internal stakeholders (Allen, Townsend, et
al., 2012; Baggott, 2005). There is a general sense, in addition, that
while strong ‘vertical accountability’ to Monitor exists, specifically with
regard to financial control, ‘horizontal’ oversight and interventions, in-
cluding with regard to clinical standards is weak (Dixon et al., 2010).
And while Trusts become more ‘business like’ in their processes (Allen,
Keen, et al., 2012), executives may be risk averse in an uncertain envi-
ronment with corporate strategies shaped largely on defensive grounds
(Exworthy, Frosini, & Jones, 2011; Mannion, Goddard, & Bate, 2007;
see also for an older perspective Hoque, Davis, & Humphreys, 2004),
and there is a lack of clarity over links between ‘performance’ and the
governance structures underpinned by the 2003, 2006 and 2012 Acts
(Anand, Exworthy, Frosini, & Jones, 2012; Veronesi & Keasey, 2011;
Currie, Humphreys, Ucbasaran, & McManus, 2008). When set against
corporatist measures, the news is not hopeful.
It is not even certain, as confirmed in the broader corporate gov-
ernance literature, that corporatisation even successfully constructs
‘accountable units’ that are legible to regulatory and auditing regimes
(for discussions of legibility see Scott, 1998) or simulates apparently
commercial spaces where financial control as a core imperative can be
imagined as market behaviour in and of itself. Foundation Trusts re-
flect instead both an idealisation of corporate forms as being in them-
selves efficient and that they reflect a hyper-modern drive to create
legible organisations that can be subject to various kinds of regulatory
oversight and in doing so can reconfigure healthcare systems in a form
that ‘accountocrats’ and ‘econocrats’ (as Christopher Hood described
them in Hood, 1995) can manage.
In fact, while ministers and other reformers might be in thrall to
the myth that efficiency emerges from the corporate form – given its
apparently ‘market’ roots – or that private forms of membership and
public forms of democracy run in parallel, the evidence suggests that
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the corporate form is convenient for particular insiders alone: either
executives pursuing their sectional interests or coalitions of executives
and others, again in pursuit of relatively narrow interests. Those who
are not party to such coalitions are, so to speak, their victims. Any
benefits are incidental. Hence the patterns of use ‘in the wild’ so to
speak.
What’s more, the corporate form is not the source of efficiency
gains, or innovation, or responsiveness. These things come from else-
where, in very specific circumstances, on very specific terms. Account-
ability, in other words, is not made in these ways: it emerges in as a
kind of social space manufactured by assemblages of fluid and often
experimental ground-level practices (on which, for instance, see Kauf-
man, 2006). In the NHS, clinical care or responsiveness to patterns of
local need and the like are likely to emerge from directly ‘regulatory
conversations’ (Black, 2002) as terms of governance – and the mean-
ing of duties in law – are negotiated between various power brokers
(Monitor, ministers, social entrepreneurs, local politicians etc).
Conclusion.
I am sceptical about the role that law can play in public administration
reform, at least when it comes to the construction of various iterations
of ‘accountability.’ Legislative reformers (in the NPM mould at least)
seem convinced that they can manufacture administration in distant
functions with the tools that they have: primarily with law. State
power to effect itself on relatively messy social functions is the core
premise of high modernism (as Scott, 1998 has it), and indeed state
power seemed to be somewhat successful when social functions were
brought directly under bureaucratic control – to an extent at least.
This may reflect the power of bureaucratic and hierarchical control
to bring itself to bear on conduct – at least towards the complicated
purposes to which bureaucratic and hierarchical control have been put.
The current era involves, however, an experiment in ‘government
at a distance’ (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; for a discus-
sion see Dean, 2010, p. 198) where reformers have set themselves with
the task of finding organisational forms that can orient institutions and
their workers towards desirable ends, can hold them to account, to pro-
duce desirable effects and all at rather more than arm’s length. The
quest for accountability has focused on the notion that accountability
can be manufactured in law through the production of particular pro-
cedural and organisational forms. This leads reformers to forms that
seem to have flourished in the private realm: mutual and commercial
companies.
The NPM diagnosis to which bureaucracy was put – that it was
not only inefficient but was inimical to liberty (a lesson they drew from
Hayek, 1944, 1960; see Gray, 1998 for an account) – was not extended
to ‘private’ hierarchical forms: they were, or so it seemed, emergent
products of market forces and were therefore the embodiment of lib-
erty, efficiency and the like. Their attractions included their seeming
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responsiveness to members, the clarity delivered by contractual con-
trol and the ferocity that would meet any directorial deviation from
the optimum balance between innovation, investment, leadership and
democracy.
This vision of the company is an illusion however. It is in itself
a vehicle for reinforcing various kinds of private power, a codification
of capitalists’ capitalism. Market forces can indeed produce efficiency,
innovation and the like, and social associations can indeed be demo-
cratic, responsive and discursive. But these phenomena come not from
procedure but from conversation: they emerge where particular peo-
ple – managers, community-activists, clinicians – develop standpoints
that are conducive to democracy, innovation etc. Law sits to the side,
doing other things.
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